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Abstract 
 
When workers are faced with the threat of unemployment, their relationship with a particular 
firm becomes valuable. As a result, a worker may comply with the terms of a relational contract 
that demands high effort even when performance is not enforceable by a third party. But can 
relational contracts motivate high effort when workers can easily find alternative jobs? We 
examine how competition for labor affects the emergence of relational contracts and their 
effectiveness in overcoming moral hazard in the labor market. We show that effective relational 
contracts do emerge in a market with excess demand for labor. Long-term relationships turn out 
to be less frequent when there is excess demand for labor than they are in a market characterized 
by exogenous unemployment. However, stronger competition for labor does not impair labor 
market efficiency: higher wages induced by competition lead to higher effort out of concerns for 
reciprocity.  (JEL: D82, J3, J41, E24, C9) 
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1. Introduction 
Firms and workers often rely on relational contracts that specify mutual 
obligations in implicit, non-verifiable agreements (Williamson 1975; MacLeod, 
2000; Baker et. al., 2002). Implicit agreements are arguably widely used 
because complete, explicit labor contracts are costly to design and enforce. 
Relational contracts need to be self-enforcing in the sense that both firms and 
workers voluntarily adhere to their obligations. Self-enforcing agreements can 
only be achieved if the future value of the relationship is sufficient for both 
   
 
 2 
parties (Bull, 1987). The value of a particular employment relationship to the 
firm or worker will depend on labor market conditions. In a market 
characterized by high unemployment, a worker who has a job is less likely to 
shirk because doing so might jeopardize his future employment prospects 
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). If, however, there is full employment, a worker 
may be more tempted to shirk because he can always switch to another firm if 
his behavior is detected. 
In this paper, we report data from an experiment that examines how 
competitive conditions in the labor market affect the emergence and 
effectiveness of relational contracts. Our main question is whether 
unemployment is a precondition for relational contracting or whether effective 
relational contracts emerge even when there is excess demand for labor.  Our 
experimental design builds on the experiment reported in Brown, Falk and Fehr 
(2004), which we will refer to as BFF2004 for the rest of the paper. Our main 
treatment implements a labor market in which worker effort is not enforced by 
a third party and firms and workers can choose to engage in bilateral relations. 
We compare this main treatment to two control treatments. In the first control 
treatment, worker effort is not third-party enforceable. However, unlike in the 
case of the main treatment, information conditions prevent the emergence of 
bilateral relations. In the second control treatment, bilateral relations can 
emerge but are not necessary to enforce worker effort because effort is third-
party enforceable. BFF2004 implements these three treatments in a market 
characterized by an excess supply of labor. For this study we implemented the 
same three treatments in a market with excess demand for labor. This design 
allows us to examine the emergence of relational contracts under full 
employment. By comparing our data to that of the experiment reported in 
BFF2004, we can also compare the impact of competition for workers on the 
prevalence and consequences of relational contracting.   
We present three main results. First, we find that even when there is excess 
demand for labor, bilateral relations between firms and workers emerge. The 
reputation incentives provided in these relationships discipline workers to 
provide high effort. We find that in our main treatment, a much higher share of 
trades take place in the context of multi-period bilateral relations than is the 
case for our control treatment featuring third-party enforcement of effort. In 
addition, we find that average worker effort in our main treatment is 
significantly higher than in our control treatment, in which bilateral relations 
are not feasible. 
Secondly, stronger demand for labor makes it more difficult to maintain 
long-term firm-worker relations. Our results suggest that firms in our main 
treatment are equally likely to offer contract renewals to well-performing 
incumbent workers under excess demand for labor and excess supply of labor. 
However, under excess demand for labor, workers are more likely to reject 
these offers and switch to a new firm. As a result, we find that in our main 
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treatment, a lower share of trades take place in long-term relations under excess 
demand than in those under excess supply. 
Thirdly, although competition for workers makes it more difficult to sustain 
long-term firm-worker relations, it does not reduce market performance. 
Aggregate effort in our main treatment is almost identical under excess demand 
for labor as it is under excess supply of labor. Our data suggest that this result 
is driven by higher wages in the market with excess demand for labor, leading 
to the provision of more pronounced reciprocal effort outside of relations.  
Our findings support the conjecture that relational labor contracts can be 
sustained even in the absence of unemployment as a disciplinary device. 
MacLeod and Malcolmson (1998) show that implicit agreements between firms 
and employees can be sustained in a market with either unemployment or full 
employment. They show that it is merely the nature of relational contracts that 
changes with market conditions; as proposed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), 
relational contracts are characterized by simple rents (i.e., efficiency wages) 
when workers are threatened by unemployment. In contrast, under full 
employment, firms must offer relation-specific quasi-rents to workers to 
motivate high performance.1
Several empirical studies have analyzed the role of quasi-rents in self-
enforcing relational contracts. Studies of wage profiles within firms show that 
wages increase strongly with seniority but that this positive tenure-earnings 
relationship is hardly related to individual productivity gains (Medoff and 
Abraham, 1980, Flabbi and Ichino, 2001; Dohmen, 2004). Although these 
studies suggest that seniority wages are offered to provide incentives to 
workers (as in Lazear 1982), the data do not allow one to identify how seniority 
wages affect worker performance or whether the effect of such deferred 
payments varies with competitive conditions in the labor market. Examining 
the payment schemes of young workers in the US, MacLeod and Parent (2000) 
show that bonus payments are more frequent in countries in which the labor 
market is tight. Their data, however, cannot distinguish discretionary bonus 
payments from explicitly guaranteed ones. It is therefore unclear whether the 
observed bonus payments are actually components of explicit or implicit 
contracts. Huck et al. (2010) provide experimental evidence that deferred 
compensation increases worker effort. However, in their experiment, firms and 
workers are randomly matched on a one-to-one basis. This means that they 
  
                                                 
1 In MacLeod and Malcolmson (1998) post-effort bonus payments generate 
such quasi-rents within a relationship. In general, however, any remuneration 
package that offers quasi-rents through deferred payments—such as “seniority 
wages” (Lazear, 1982) or explicit “bonding” (Carmichael, 1985)—or on the 
basis of informational advantages (Boot and Thakor, 1994) can sustain an 
implicit agreement under full employment. 
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cannot relate deferred payments to relational contracting or study how they are 
affected by labor market conditions. 
Our results also suggest that relational contracts may be harder to sustain in 
macroeconomic upswings. Field evidence shows that employment relations 
may be more difficult to sustain when the labor market is tight. Examining data 
from 16 industrialized countries, Auer and Cazes (2000) finds that job tenure 
drops when economic growth leads to high demand for labor. Examining 
worker flow data from the United States, Bleakley et al. (1999) show that 
workers’ switching behavior is responsible for this breakdown of long-term 
employment relationships. They find that significantly more workers 
voluntarily leave their jobs during expansionary periods of the business cycle 
than during recessions. However, these studies can hardly identify whether 
long-term employment is a result of relational contracts between firms and 
workers, specific human capital investment, or switching costs in the labor 
market. As a result, the fact that many employment relationships appear to 
collapse under full employment does not imply that it is implicit agreements 
that are falling apart.  
This paper contributes to the growing experimental literature on implicit 
agreements and reputation incentives in competitive labor markets. BFF2004 
shows that bilateral relations do emerge and discipline workers to provide high 
effort in a labor market characterized by exogenous unemployment. 
Implementing a similar gift-exchange game with endogenous partner choice, 
Wu and Roe (2007) show that bilateral firm-worker relations also motivate 
firms to deliver promised wages, whereas Linardi and Camerer (2008) show 
that firm-worker relations can survive economic shocks—i.e., economic 
downturns in which firms cannot hire. Most recently, Roe and Wu (2009) 
conducted one-shot social preference decisions prior to a labor market game; 
they confirm that reputation incentives discipline selfish workers and selfish 
firms. Each of the above studies implements a labor market with exogenous 
unemployment in which efficiency wages and the threat of unemployment can 
discipline workers. In this paper, we show that implicit agreements between 
firms and workers can at least partly be maintained in a market in which 
workers must not fear unemployment.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present our experimental 
design and predictions in Section 2. In Section 4, we present our results, and 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Experimental design 
2.1. Gift-exchange game with endogenous partner choice 
Our experimental labor market lasts 15 periods with two stages in each 
period. During the first stage, firms make contract offers that specify a non-
contingent wage w and a desired effort ẽ, whereas workers decide whether to 
accept or reject these offers. The posting and acceptance of contracts is 
conducted during a continuous auction involving all firms and workers. A firm 
can make private or public offers. In a private offer, the firm specifies the 
identification number (ID) of the worker with whom it wants to trade. Only this 
worker is informed about the offer. In a public offer, all workers and all other 
firms are informed about the offer. As a result, any worker can accept a public 
offer. In a given trading period, firms can make as many private and public 
offers as they want to make. As soon as a worker has accepted one of the 
offers, the firm that has made the offer is matched with this worker and 
informed of the worker’s ID. Each firm can hire one worker at most, and each 
worker can accept only one wage offer. Once an offer has been accepted, all of 
the firm’s other standing offers are immediately removed from the market. At 
all times during a trading period, firms are informed about the workers who 
remain in the market. This is done to prevent private offers to workers who 
have already signed a contract. 
Once all firms or workers have concluded a trade, or once the maximum 
time for the trading stage has elapsed, the second stage of the period begins. At 
this stage, the actual effort e of the worker is determined, as are the payoffs for 
each firm and worker.   
 
The material payoff of a firm per period is given by 



=
concluded iscontract  no if ,0
concluded iscontract  a if ,-10·
),(
we
ewπ   
 
The material payoff of a worker is given by 



=
concluded iscontract  no if ,5
concluded iscontract  a if ,
),(
w-c(e)
ewv   
where c(e) denotes the cost of supplying effort e. 
 
The set of feasible wage levels is given by w ∈ [1,…,100]. The cost of 
effort schedule c(e) for workers is strictly increasing and exhibits increasing 
marginal costs (see Table 1).   
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Table 1 here 
 
The payoff functions, the number of firms and workers, the cost of 
effort, and the fact that there were 15 trading periods are all common 
knowledge. At the end of each period, each participant is informed about the 
contract [w,ẽ] he has concluded, the actual effort level, e, his own payoff, the 
payoff of his trading partner and the ID of his trading partner. Participants write 
this information on a separate sheet of paper to ensure that they are always 
fully informed about their own trading history. 
 
2.2. Treatments 
We examine two labor market conditions. The first is a labor market with an 
excess demand for labor (D market). Under this condition, there are 10 firms 
and 7 workers in the market. We compare the market with excess demand for 
labor to one with an excess supply of labor (S market): i.e., 7 firms and 10 
workers. The data for the market with excess supply of labor are taken from the 
experiment reported in BFF2004.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
 For both market conditions (D and S), we implement three treatments, 
in which contract enforcement and information conditions are varied.  
  Our main treatment is the Incomplete Contracts with Fixed 
identification (ICF) treatment. In this treatment, contracts are not exogenously 
enforced: i.e., workers can choose any feasible effort e irrespective of the 
contractually proposed level ẽ.  Also, in this treatment, firms and workers have 
the option of trading repeatedly with each other because the subjects have fixed 
IDs throughout the experiment. A firm can thus make offers to the same worker 
(same ID) in consecutive periods, and if the worker accepts the offers, a long-
term relationship is established. 
Our first control treatment is the Complete Contracts (C) treatment. In this 
treatment, the proposed effort of the firm is exogenously enforced: i.e., e = ẽ. 
Otherwise, all procedures and parameters are identical to those in the ICF 
treatment. In particular, all participants have fixed IDs, such that a firm can 
establish a relationship with a particular worker (and vice versa). This control 
treatment generates benchmark results for the frequency of long-term 
relationships and for firms’ contract offers when effort is third-party 
enforceable.  
Our second control treatment is the Incomplete Contracts with Random 
Identification (ICR) treatment. As in the ICF, effort is not enforceable in this 
treatment. Unlike in the ICF, however, information conditions prevent firms 
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and workers from establishing relationships. This is ensured by randomly 
assigning IDs to participants during each period (both firms and workers). 
Participants are therefore unable to identify whom they have traded with in the 
past and thus cannot deliberately maintain relationships. This control treatment 
provides benchmark results for effort when contracts are not third-party-
enforceable and when relational contracts are not feasible.  
In total we thus have six treatments. We abbreviate, for example, the 
treatment with incomplete contracts and fixed identification (ICF) and an 
excess demand for labor (D) by ICF-D. 
 
2.3. Procedures 
The experimental instructions were framed in a neutral goods market 
language.2
The experiment was conducted using the “z-tree” software (Fischbacher, 
2007). Prior to the 15 periods, participants completed two practice periods to 
acclimate to the computer environment. During both practice periods, the 
subjects only went through the first stage of the experiment (posting and 
accepting offers), and no money could be earned during these periods. 
 Firms were called “buyers,” and their contract offers were framed as 
“price offers” for “desired quality”. Workers were called “sellers,” and their 
actual effort choice was framed as “actual quality”. A translated version of the 
original (German) experimental instructions is provided in Brown et al. (2008).  
We conducted five sessions for each treatment except the ICR-S, for which 
4 sessions were implemented. All sessions for the ICF-D and C-D treatment 
were conducted in November 2002, while the sessions for the ICR-D treatment 
were conducted in May/June 2004. As mentioned above, the data for the ICF-
S, ICR-S, and C-S treatments were taken from the experiment reported in 
BFF2004. The sessions for these treatments were conducted between June 
1999 and May 2001. The subjects in all sessions were students from the 
University of Zurich and the ETH Zurich.3
                                                 
2 We framed the experiment in neutral market terminology to avoid eliciting 
behavior based on participants’ preconceptions about how the labor market 
works. We acknowledge that this procedure cannot fully prevent subjects from 
associating the experiment with the labor market or other markets with which 
they may or may not have experience. Because there is no reason to believe 
that such associations vary across our treatments, they should not bias or 
invalidate our cross-treatment comparisons. 
 No subject participated in more than 
one session, so 493 subjects in total (17 in each session) participated in the 
3 Subjects were recruited by telephone from a database of students who had 
expressed interest in taking part in an experiment. Students with economics and 
psychology majors were excluded from the experiment. 
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experiment. On average, a session lasted 120 minutes, and each subject earned 
roughly CHF 60. Average earnings were thus roughly 20 US$ per hour.4
 
  
2.4. Behavioral predictions 
All participants were informed that the experiment would last exactly 15 
periods. Assuming common knowledge of selfish behavior each treatment 
would therefore constitute a finite game of complete information. In this case, 
the ICF and ICR conditions in which effort is not third-party-enforced should 
yield minimum effort for both the excess demand and the excess supply 
markets. Firms anticipate that all workers perform e=1 in period 15, no matter 
the history of the experiment. They therefore offer wages that just meet the 
workers’ participation constraint (in the ICR-S) or their own participation 
constraint (ICR-D), assuming minimum effort provision. Via backward 
induction, firms will offer the same contract in periods 1 through 14, and 
workers’ performance will always be minimal. These predictions regarding the 
ICF and ICR conditions are in strong contrast to that for the C condition in 
which effort is  third-party enforceable and thus the value-maximizing effort 
level e=10 can be implemented.  
Brown et al. (2008) offer behavioral predictions for our experiment 
assuming the presence of some non-identifiable “fair” workers.5
                                                 
4 US$ 1 = CHF 1.55 in 2002. 
 Under this 
assumption, our ICF condition constitutes a repeated game of incomplete 
information. In such games, reputation concerns can motivate money-
maximizing agents to imitate the behavior of non-money maximizing agents 
even if the horizon is finite (see Kreps et al. 1982). In the ICF-D treatment, 
reputation incentives must be based on quasi-rents in bilateral relations, with 
incumbent firms offering higher future wages to high-performing workers than 
“outside” firms offer in the public market. We show that “outside“ firms will 
offer lower wages in the public market if they expect that selfish workers will 
5 Experimental studies find that fairness concerns motivate the behavior of 
some subjects in gift-exchange games similar to that implemented in this 
experiment (Fehr et al., 1993; Fehr and Falk, 1999; as well as in a wider range 
of economic settings (see e.g. Camerer, 2003). The importance of fairness 
motives in experiments is mirrored by worker behavior in the labor market 
(Bewley, 1995; Blinder and Choi, 1990). In Brown et al. (2008), we derive 
formal predictions for our treatments assuming that there is a share p of fair 
workers who adhere to a contract [w,ẽ] if and only if it offers them at least a 
fair share of earnings: w-c(ẽ)≥  qẽ-w.  
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be more likely to switch firms.6
Under the ICR condition, the presence of some fair workers implies a 
positive wage-effort relationship. However, firms can only profitably induce 
non-minimal effort (i.e., e>1) if there are sufficiently many fair-minded 
workers in the market. Competition among firms in the ICR-D treatment 
implies that firms will offer higher wages than in the ICR-S treatment. Indeed, 
for a wide range of beliefs about the share of fair workers, we predict that 
competition for workers in the ICR-D will force firms to offer wages that 
induce non-minimal effort (e >1), whereas the effort level that we predict for 
the ICR-S treatment is still minimal (e =1).  Thus we expect higher wages and 
aggregate effort in the ICR-D than in the ICR treatment. 
 These reputation incentives raise the aggregate 
worker effort level beyond that of the ICR-D treatment, in which bilateral 
relations are not feasible. In the spirit of MacLeod and Malcolmson (1998) 
relational contracts in the ICF-D treatment may generate equally high effort 
levels as in the ICF-S treatment, in which relational contracts are driven by 
efficiency wages and the threat of unemployment. However, with the ICF-D 
and ICF-S being dynamic games of incomplete information, both treatments 
have multiple equilibria. It is therefore an empirical question how competition 
for workers truly affects relational contracting.  
The presence of some fair workers does not change the aggregate effort 
predictions in our C condition. In this treatment, effort is third-party-
enforceable, so that maximum effort is implemented even if all workers are 
selfish. This will also be the case with some fair workers. Note, however, that 
effort provision in the C-D and C-S treatments is not dependent on the 
formation of relationships. As a result, we predict fewer long-term relationships 
under the C condition than under the ICF condition. 
In summary, we expect the following outcomes regarding labor market 
competition and relational contracting. Despite full employment in the ICF-D 
treatment, bilateral relations emerge, and the reputational incentives that are 
part of these relationships raise aggregate effort. We expect more firm-worker 
relations in the ICF-D treatment than in the C-D treatment and higher effort in 
the ICF-D treatment than the ICR-D treatment. Competition for workers may 
not reduce the prevalence or efficacy of relational contracts. We expect a 
similar pattern of firm-worker relations and similar effort provision in the ICF-
D and ICF-S treatments.  
 
                                                 
6 Alternatively, quasi-rents could emerge in our experiment from deferred 
compensation in the form of rising wage schedules within relationships, as in 
Lazear (1982).  
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3. Results 
In presenting our results, we proceed as follows. First, we present an 
overview of the aggregate outcome of our six treatments. To examine the 
emergence of relational contracts under excess demand for labor, we compare 
the outcome of the ICF-D treatment to that of the ICR-D and C-D treatments. 
To study the impact of competition on relational contracting, we contrast the 
outcome of the ICF-D treatment with that of the ICF-S treatment. This sets the 
stage for a more detailed analysis of relationship formation and effort 
provision.  
 
3.1. Main treatment effects 
In this section, we present summary statistics for each treatment (see Table 
3) and compare treatments using Mann-Whitney tests based on session 
averages for each statistic. 
Our first observation from Table 3 is that our treatments were successful in 
inducing competition for labor. Our first indicator of competition is the number 
of contracts posted by firms per period. Firms make more offers in the ICF-D, 
ICR-D and C-D treatments than they do in the ICF-S, ICR-S and C-S 
treatments. For example, the number of contract offers posted by firms is 
almost four times higher in the ICF-D (4.6 per firm and period) than the ICF-S 
treatment (1.2).7 Moreover, competition is persistent throughout the ICF-D 
treatment, with at least 3.5 offers per firm in all periods.8 Our second indicator 
of competition is the share of firms’ offers that are public and thus contribute to 
a competitive market place. The share of public offers is substantially higher in 
the ICF-D treatment than in the ICF-S treatment (43% vs. 27%).9
                                                 
7 One-sided Mann-Whitney tests using session averages as observations show 
that there are more offers in the ICF-D than in the ICF-S (p=.004), more offers 
in the ICR-D than in the ICR-S (p=.004), and more in the C-D than the C-S 
(p=.008).  
 In contrast, 
excess demand for labor does not raise the share of public offers under our two 
control conditions (C-D vs. C-S or ICR-D vs. ICR-S).  
8 There is no major decline in the number of offers made by firms in the ICF-D 
over time. There are 4.2 offers per firm in period 1; this figure rises gradually 
to 5.7 per firm in period 5 and then declines gradually to 3.5 in period 13, after 
which it rises again to 4.26 per firm in period 15. 
9 A one-sided Mann-Whitney test using session averages as observations shows 
that there are more public offers in the ICF-D than the ICF-S (p=.075).   
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To provide a further indication of competition for workers, we compare 
wages offered by firms in public offers, private offers to their incumbent 
workers, and private offers to non-incumbent workers. We find that the 
difference between private incumbent wages and public wages is lower in the 
ICF-D treatment (14.6) than in the ICF-S treatment (23.5). Similarly, the 
difference between private incumbent wages and private non-incumbent wages 
is lower in the ICF-D (8.7) than the ICF-S treatment (16.7).10 Considering the 
dispersion of wage offers (measured by the coefficient of variation), we find 
that the dispersion of private incumbent offers is similar in the ICF-D (0.30) 
and ICF-S (0.28), whereas the dispersion of public wages (0.36 vs. 0.48) and 
private non-incumbent wages (0.33 vs. 0.48) is lower in the ICF-D treatment 
than in the ICF-S treatment.11
 
 Together, these results suggest that workers in 
the ICF-D are more likely to get higher wage offers from outside firms than 
workers in the ICF-S treatment. 
Table 3 here 
 
Our second observation from Table 3 is that despite strong competition for 
workers, bilateral relations do emerge in the ICF-D treatment, and 
reputational incentives in this treatment do raise the aggregate effort level. The 
table displays the share of trades that take place in one-shot transactions (1 
period), short relationships (2-5 periods) and long relationships (6-15 periods) 
by treatment. In the ICF-D treatment, 24% of trades take place in relationships 
of 2-5 periods and 23% in relationships of 6-15 periods. In comparison, in the 
C-D treatment with third-party enforcement of effort, more than 85% of all 
trades take place in one-shot transactions.  
The presence of reputational incentives in the ICF-D treatment is associated 
with higher aggregate effort: we find significantly higher effort in the ICF-D 
(6.7) than in the ICR-D (4.9) where reputational incentives are absent by 
design.12
                                                 
10 One-sided Mann-Whitney tests using session averages as observations show 
that the difference between private incumbent and public wage offers 
(p=0.008) and the difference between private incumbent and private non-
incumbent wage offers (p=0.048) is lower in the ICF-D than in the ICF-S. 
 The development of effort over time in the ICF-D provides further 
11 One-sided Mann-Whitney tests using session averages as observations show 
that the coefficient of variation for private incumbent wage offers is not lower 
in the ICF-D treatment as in the ICF-S treatment (p=0.917), while the 
coefficient of variation for public wage offers (p=0.076) and private non-
incumbent wage offers (p=.076) is lower in the ICF-D than in the ICF-S.  
12 One-sided Mann-Whitney tests of session averages show that multi-period 
relations are significantly more frequent in the ICF-D than in the C-D treatment 
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support for the conjecture that reputation incentives were strong in this 
treatment. Figure 1 shows that mean effort rises slightly from period 1 through 
period 11 and then suffers a substantial end-game effect as reputation 
incentives wear off at the end of the experiment. The ICR-D treatment, by 
contrast, shows a more or less constant mean effort level over time.  
Figure 1 here 
 
Our third observation from Table 3 is that stronger competition for workers 
under the ICF condition reduces the number of long-term relationships but 
does not significantly alter aggregate effort. In the ICF-D treatment, 47% of all 
trades take place in multi-period relationships, and 23% take place in 
relationships of 6 or more periods. This percentage is substantially smaller than 
in the ICF-S treatment, in which 62% of all trades take place in multi-period 
relationships and 45% take place in relationships of 6 or more periods.13
Surprisingly, the lower number of long-term relationships in the ICF-D 
treatment compared to the ICF-S treatment does not imply lower market 
efficiency. Average effort in the ICF-D  (6.7) is practically identical to that in 
the ICF-S (6.9). Moreover, as displayed in Figure 1, the time trend for mean 
effort is almost identical in the ICF-D and ICF-S treatments: mean effort in 
both treatments first rises gradually and then is subject to a significant drop in 
the final periods of the experiment. In the ICF-D treatment, however, the end-
game effect on effort starts earlier and is larger than in the ICF-S treatment, 
providing the first evidence that reputation incentives may be more difficult to 
sustain. 
  
Although efficiency in the ICF-condition seems unaffected by competition, 
the distribution of gains from trade is tilted to the benefit of workers. Table 3 
shows that the average wage paid by firms is significantly higher in the ICF-D 
treatment (54.2) than the ICF-S treatment (40.1).14
                                                                                                                      
(p=.004) and that effort is higher in the ICF-D than the ICR-D treatment 
(p=.028). 
 As a result, workers’ 
payoffs are higher and firms’ profits are lower in the ICF-D than in the ICF-S. 
Figure 1b shows that the difference between the mean wages for the ICF-D and 
13  Due to strong variation in relationship duration across sessions, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the frequency of bilateral relations is equal in the two 
treatments. Using the share of trades in  one-shot transactions (versus multi-
period relationships) per session as our observations, we conduct a one-sided 
Mann-Whitney Test that yields a p-value of 0.1548. 
14 A one-sided Mann-Whitney test based on session averages suggests that 
wages are higher in the ICF-D treatment than in the ICF-S treatment (p=0.004). 
A two-sided test does not reject the hypothesis that the effort level is identical 
in these two treatments (p=0.841)  
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ICF-S is quite stable prior to the end-game effect, which (as discussed above) is 
stronger in the ICF-D treatment. The difference between the mean wages for 
the two treatments begins at 14.4 in period 1 and reaches 13.8 in period 12 
before falling to 7.3 in the final period.  
Wages under the ICF condition react much more weakly to competition for 
labor than in the C condition, wherein effort is third-party-enforced. Table 3 
shows that wages in the C-D treatment are 39.7 points higher than in the C-S 
treatment. In contrast, the difference in wages between the ICF-D and ICF-S is 
only 14.1 points. This substantial difference suggests that contractual 
incompleteness causes pronounced wage rigidity: wages are less sensitive to 
changes in market conditions when effort is not third-party-enforced. This is 
further supported by a comparison between the ICR-D and ICR-S treatments. 
Table 3 shows that the wage difference between the ICR-D and ICR-S is on 
average 18.3 points and is thus also much smaller than between the C-D and C-
S. Figure 1b shows that the wage difference between the ICR-D and ICR-S 
increases over time from 10.6 in period 1 to 21.6 in period 15. This mirrors the 
widening gap between the levels of effort provision between the two 
treatments, as displayed in Figure 1a. 
In summary, the results presented in Table 3 and Figure 1 suggest that there 
are substantial reputation incentives for workers in the ICF-D treatment even 
though they are not threatened by unemployment. However, stronger 
competition for workers seems to make it harder to sustain the firm-worker 
relations that underlie these incentives. In the following, we examine the 
impact of competition on the formation of relations and worker effort in more 
detail. 
 
3.2. Competition and firms’ contract offers 
Theory suggests that firms in the ICF-D and ICF-S treatment maintain 
reputational incentives for workers by conditioning their contract offers and 
wages on past effort performance. Are firms less tough on their workers when 
they face outside competition in the ICF-D, or do firms pursue a similar 
contingent contract policy irrespective of competitive conditions in the labor 
market? In Table 4, we examine firms’ contract offers, relating their contract 
renewals and wage offers to (i) workers’ prior effort, (ii) whether the worker 
met the firms’ expectations for prior performance, and (iii) whether the 
experiment is in its final periods (controlling for potential end-game effects).  
The results presented in Table 4 suggest that competition for workers does 
not affect the contingent contract policy of firms. Columns (1-3) of the table 
examine a firms’ probability of renewing a contract with an incumbent worker. 
The results reported in columns (1-2) show that in both ICF-D and ICF-S, firms 
are more likely to renew contracts if the worker provided higher effort in the 
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prior period. Controlling for worker effort, however, we do not find a robust 
effect of complying with firms’ expectations on contract renewal. In column 
(3), we analyze whether there are treatment differences in this contingent 
renewal policy by including interaction terms of our explanatory variables with 
a treatment dummy for the ICF-D.  The estimated coefficients for these 
interaction terms suggest no treatment differences. In columns (4-6) of Table 4, 
we examine the rents offered by firms in repeat contracts. The dependent 
variable in these columns is the difference between the wage offered by a firm 
to its incumbent worker and the mean public wage offered in the market in that 
period. We find that in both the ICF-D and ICF-S firms offer higher rents to 
workers who provide higher effort in the prior period. Again, the pooled 
regression in column (6) suggests that there is no significant difference in 
firms’ contract offers across treatments.15
 
 
Table 4 here 16
 
 
3.3. Competition, contract acceptance and worker effort 
The previous section suggests that firms’ contract offer policies are not 
strongly influenced by labor market conditions. In this section, we examine 
how competition affects workers’ acceptance of contracts and their effort 
provision.  
In the ICF-D and ICF-S treatments, firms offer workers who delivered the 
level of desired effort a renewed contract in 80% of cases. Our summary 
statistics in Table 3 show, however, that there are fewer long-term firm-worker 
relations in the ICF-D than in the ICF-S treatment. This suggests that the higher 
break-up rate for relationships in the ICF-D is due to workers’ rejecting 
contracts from their incumbent firms in favor of an offer from an outside firm. 
                                                 
15 The contingent contract renewal policy observed in the ICF-D and ICF-S 
treatments does not seem to be driven by reciprocal firms rather than by 
relational contracts. To disentangle the forward-looking incentive effect from 
the backward-looking reward effect, we regress firms’ wage offers to their 
incumbent worker in periods 11-15 on prior effort, a period 15 dummy, and the 
interaction term of the two. We find that the interaction term is significantly 
negative, suggesting that wage offers to incumbent workers are not fully driven 
by backward-looking reward considerations.   
16 Robustness tests  accounting for the dynamic nature of our data in the ICF 
condition (Arellano-Bond estimation method) do, however, confirm the 
qualitative findings in Table 4. Further robustness tests suggest that the 
coefficients reported in columns (1, 2, 4, and 5) of Table 4 for Effort and 
Negative surprise do not vary significantly over time.  
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Our data show that this is indeed the case. In the ICF-S treatment, 98% of the 
workers who receive a contract offer from their incumbent firm accept this 
offer. In contrast, in the ICF-D treatment, only 72% of renewed contract offers 
are accepted. This lower acceptance rate for offers in the ICF-D as compared to 
the ICF-S is confirmed by a regression analysis that relates contract acceptance 
by workers to a treatment dummy, controlling for the wage offered by firms 
and whether the offer was made in the final periods of the experiment.  
Looking more closely at those instances in which a worker rejects a contract 
offer from his incumbent firm in the ICF-D treatment, we find that in 74% of 
these cases, the worker accepts an outside offer with a wage at least as high as 
that offered by his current firm. An interesting finding arises from those cases 
where a worker rejects a renewed offer by his current firm and accepts a lower 
wage from an outside firm. In 14 of these 16 cases, the current firm had either 
lowered its wage offer or not increased it from that offered in the prior period. 
Together, these findings suggest that these workers broke off relationships 
when they saw better outside opportunities or when their current firm did not 
meet their wage expectations.  
Table 5 examines how labor market conditions affect workers’ effort 
provision. The regressions presented in columns (1-3) of the table relate worker 
effort in the ICF-D and ICF-S treatments to (i) the wage offered by the firm, 
(ii) whether the offer was private or public, and (iii) whether the trade took 
place in the final periods of the experiment: i.e., periods 11-15. As argued in 
BFF 2004, both reciprocal motives and reputation concerns imply that workers 
should perform higher effort if the wage offered by the firm is higher. 
Likewise, private contract offers may induce higher effort because they may be 
perceived as a kind act or may signal that the firm is interested in a long-term 
relationship. Finally, if reputation concerns motivate effort provision in the 
ICF-D and ICF-S treatments, we expect lower effort provision in the final 
periods of the experiment, in which such concerns wear off. 
The results reported in Table 5 show a similar qualitative pattern of effort 
provision in the ICF-D (column 1) and ICF-S (column 2) treatments. Higher 
wages and private offers induce workers to provide higher effort. Moreover, 
the negative coefficient of the Period 11-15 dummy confirms the presence of 
significant reputation incentives in both treatments: workers respond to the 
same contract offer with higher effort in earlier periods than in later ones.  
While the main pattern of effort provision is similar in the ICF-D and ICF-S 
treatments, the pooled regression reported in column (3) of Table 5 displays 
some differences in terms of the quantitative impact of wages, private offers 
and the end-game effect on effort. In particular, the weaker effort-wage 
relationship in the ICF-D than in the ICF-S suggests that stronger competition 
for labor does reduce reputation incentives. The weaker effort-wage 
relationship in the ICF-D than in the ICF-S treatment is confirmed in Figure 2, 
which displays the mean effort provided in both treatments for four different 
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wage-classes (0-20, 21-40, 41-60, and 61-100). The figure shows that mean 
effort provision in the ICF-D is higher than in the ICF-S for wages below 40 
and lower for wages above 40, leading to a less steep effort-wage profile.  
Table 5 here 17
 
 
The results above suggest that relational contracting is partly impaired by 
stronger competition for labor. It therefore remains to be explained why 
aggregate effort is almost identical in the ICF-D and ICF-S treatments: if 
excess demand for labor implies that workers get better outside offers, even if 
they shirk on their incumbent firm, how then can we then explain the fact that 
aggregate effort is not lower? One potential explanation is that weaker 
reputation incentives in the ICF-D treatment (as compared to the ICF-S 
treatment) may be compensated for by an increase in reciprocal effort provision 
due to higher market wages. Our summary statistics in Table 2 show that the 
mean wage level in the ICF-D treatment is significantly higher than in the ICF-
S treatment (54.2 vs. 40.1). Thus, if the reciprocal reaction to a wage offer is 
similar across market conditions, this wage increase should indeed induce 
higher effort provision based on reciprocal motives in the ICF-D. 
To isolate the impact of labor market conditions on reciprocal effort 
provision, columns (4-6) of Table 5 examine worker performance in the ICR-D 
and ICR-S treatments in which reputation incentives are absent and only 
concerns for reciprocity can explain non-minimal effort provision. Again, we 
relate worker effort to (i) the wage offered by the firm, (ii) whether the offer 
was private, and (iii) whether the trade took place in the final periods of the 
experiment. If some workers exhibit reciprocal preferences, we should expect a 
positive relation between effort and wages in both treatments. Moreover, 
private offers may be viewed by some workers as a kind action that could also 
lead to higher effort. The extent to which workers perceive wages and private 
offers as generous and reciprocate this generosity is likely to depend on labor 
market conditions. In particular, in the ICR-D treatment, high wages are less 
likely to signal generous intentions on the part of firms because competition 
forces firms to offer higher wages. Likewise, receiving a private offer may be 
                                                 
17 Robustness tests using the Arellano-Bond estimation method confirm the 
qualitative results in Table 5.   Further robustness tests suggests that the effort-
wage relationship becomes weaker over time in the ICF-D and ICR-D but not 
in the ICF-S and ICR-S. We replicate columns (1, 2, 4 and 5) of Table 5, 
including the interaction times Period 11-15*Wage and Period 11-15*Private. 
The interaction term Period 11-15*Private is not significant in any of the 
regressions. The interaction term Period 11-15*Wage is not significant in the 
regressions for the ICF-S or ICR-S treatments but is significant, positive and of 
similar magnitude in the ICF-D and ICR-D treatments. This result. 
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perceived as kinder in a situation with an excess supply of labor. Existing 
theory (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004, Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) and 
evidence (Brandts and Charness, 2004) suggest that first-mover intentions may 
affect second-mover behavior in our gift-exchange game. Thus, we may find 
that effort is less sensitive to wages and private offers in the ICR-D treatment 
than in the ICR-S treatment.  
The results presented in Table 5 show, as expected, that workers reward 
higher wages and private offers with higher effort in the ICR-D and the ICR-S 
treatments (see columns 4-5).18 The pooled regression reported in column (6) 
of the table displays a surprising result: competition for workers does not seem 
to weaken the reciprocal provision of effort under the ICR condition. The 
insignificant treatment effect Excess demand and interaction terms Excess 
demand*Wage and Excess demand*Private suggest that the reaction of 
workers to higher wages and private offers is similar in the ICR-D and ICR-S 
treatments.19
The similar effort-wage relationship in the ICR-D and the ICR-S treatments 
is again confirmed in Figure 2. For wages below 60, which account for over 
60% of trades in the ICR-D treatment and 85% of trades in the ICR-S, we find 
almost identical mean effort provision. The figure does suggest that effort 
provision in the ICR-S is substantially higher than in the ICR-D for wages 
exceeding 60: i.e., wages that provide the worker with more than an equal split 
of the surplus if he provides the maximum effort. However, such wages are 
paid in less than 5% of trades in both treatments. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
All in all, our results suggest that higher effort provision by fair workers 
explains why aggregate effort is similar in the ICF-D than in the ICF-S despite 
less relational contracting. The stable wage-effort relationship for reciprocal 
workers across market conditions (as observed in the ICR-D and ICR-S 
                                                 
18 Because reputation incentives cannot emerge under the ICR condition we 
expect that effort will not fall towards the end of the experiment in either the 
ICR-D or the ICR-S treatment. The results presented in columns (4-5) show, 
indeed, that there is no end-game effect on effort in either treatment. 
19 In the appendix, we classify each worker according to the average share of 
the surplus that his effort choice has allocated to the firm. We find that a 
substantial share of workers in both treatments display strong “reciprocal” 
preferences: 46% of workers in the ICR-D and 60% in the ICR-S provide effort 
so that at least 30% of the surplus goes to the firm. Non-parametric tests 
(Pearson Chi-square test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov distribution test) cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the distribution of fairness attitudes is the same in the 
ICR-D and ICR-S. 
   
 
 18 
treatments), combined with the higher wage level in the ICF-D treatment 
(compared to the ICF-S treatment) seem to offset lower effort by selfish 
workers due to weaker reputational incentives. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the emergence and impact of relational contracts 
under excess demand for labor and compare them to a labor market with 
exogenous unemployment. We show that workers provide a high level of effort 
even when they are not threatened by unemployment. High-performing 
workers receive higher wage offers from their current firm than from outside 
firms. This motivates workers to perform at a high level rather than to shirk and 
switch firms.  
Confirming prior field studies (Bleakley et al., 1999), we find that workers 
are more likely to quit their jobs under full employment than when 
unemployment prevails and that this leads to fewer long-term employment 
relationships. However, this reduction in relational contracting does not 
undermine aggregate effort provision because higher wages induce an increase 
in reciprocal effort provision. Thus, our results suggest that unemployment is 
not a necessary disciplining device in labor markets. 
 
 
Appendix: Fairness attitudes of workers in our sample 
 
The ICR-D and ICR-S treatments in which information conditions 
prevent reputation incentives allow us to measure “fair” or “reciprocal” 
behavior in our experiment. In Table A1, we classify the fairness 
attitudes of each worker in our ICR-D and ICR-S treatments based on 
the distribution of the surplus induced by the worker’s effort choice in 
each trade. For each worker, we calculate the average share of the 
surplus that the worker provides to firms across all of the worker’s 
trades. Following the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model, this share should 
increase with a worker’s aversion to advantageous inequality but should 
not exceed 50% if workers are averse to disadvantageous inequality. Our 
results show that a substantial share of workers display strong “fairness” 
preferences: 46% of workers in the ICR-D and 60% in the ICR-S 
provide effort so that at least 30% of the surplus goes to the firm. Non-
parametric tests (the Pearson Chi-square test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
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distribution test) do not reject the hypothesis that the distribution of 
fairness attitudes is identical in the ICR-D and ICR-S treatments.  
 
Table A1 here 
 
The proportion of fair workers in our sample is comparable to that found 
in previous studies. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and Andreoni et al. 
(2003) find that roughly one-half of their subjects display social 
preferences. At the upper bound, Fischbacher and Gächter (2008) find 
that only 71% of their subjects display non-free-riding behavior. At the 
lower bound, Roe and Wu (2009) classify 28% of their participants as 
non-selfish.  
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Figure 1.  Effort and wage by period 
 
Figure 1a. Effort provision 
 
Notes. This figure displays the mean effort provided by period across treatments. In all four treatments 
effort was not third-party enforceable so that workers could provide any effort level in the range 1, 2, 
…,10. Information conditions made relational contracting feasible in both ICF treatments (ICF-D and 
ICF-S) while in both ICR treatments (ICR-D and ICR-S) relational contracting was not possible. In the 
ICF-D and ICR-D treatments the market was characterized by an excess demand for labor, while in the 
ICF-S and ICR-S there was an excess supply of labor. 
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Figure 1b. Wages in accepted contracts 
 
Notes. This figure displays the mean wage offered in accepted contracts across treatments. Information 
conditions made relational contracting feasible in both ICF treatments (ICF-D and ICF-S) while in both 
ICR treatments (ICR-D and ICR-S) relational contracting was not possible. In the ICF-D and ICR-D 
treatments the market was characterized by an excess demand for labor, while in the ICF-S and ICR-S 
there was an excess supply of labor. 
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 Figure 2.  Effort-wage relationship 
 
 
 
Notes. This figure displays the mean effort provided by workers in relation to the wage offered in the 
accepted contract. We display the mean effort for four wage classes: 0-20, 21-40, 41-60 and 61-100. 
Information conditions made relational contracting feasible in both ICF treatments (ICF-D and ICF-S) 
while in both ICR treatments (ICR-D and ICR-S) relational contracting was not possible. In the ICF-D 
and ICR-D treatments the market was characterized by an excess demand for labor, while in the ICF-S 
and ICR-S there was an excess supply of labor. 
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Table 1. Cost of effort schedule 
 
 
 
Effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Cost of effort 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
   
 
 
Table 2. Treatments 
 
  Excess demand for labor Excess supply of labor 
(10 firms, 7 workers) (7 firms, 10 workers) 
Effort: no 3rd party 
enforcement 
    
Relations:  feasible ICF -D ICF-S 
      
Effort: 3rd party enforcement     
Relations:  feasible C-D C-D 
      
Effort: no 3rd party 
enforcement 
    
Relations: not feasible ICR-D ICR-S 
      
 
Notes. Data for the ICF-S, ICR-S and C-S treatments are taken from the experiment reported in BFF2004. 
In that paper these treatments were labeled ICF, ICR, and C respectively. 
 
  
Table 3. Summary statistics by treatment 
 
Competitive conditions   Excess demand (10 firms, 7 workers)   Excess supply (7 firms, 10 workers) 
Treatment  ICF-D ICR-D C-D   ICF-S ICR-S C-S 
Sessions  5 5 5   5 4 5 
Potential trades   525 525 525   525 420 525 
Contract offers  4.6 4.1 4.8   1.2 1.8 2.4 
Public offers   0.43 0.54 0.59   0.27 0.61 0.58 
Private incumbent wage  53.8 35.0 67.7   48.9 21.0 35.6 
Public wage  39.2 34.7 67.8  25.4 20 31.4 
Private non-incumbent wage   45.1 36.1 67.3   32.2 25.5 33.0 
Realized trades  520 523 518   523 417 519 
in 1 period interaction  0.53 0.91 0.85   0.38 0.92 0.89 
in 2-5 period relations  0.24 0.09 0.14   0.17 0.08 0.07 
in 6-15 period relations   0.23   0.02   0.45   0.04 
Efficiency & distribution         
Effort  6.7 4.9 9.6   6.9 3.3 9.3 
Wage  54.2 41.6 72.6   40.1 24.3 33.3 
Payoff firm  13 8 23   29 9 60 
Payoff worker   44 35 56   29 21 17 
 
 
Notes. This table presents mean statistics by treatment. Contract offers is the number of offers posted by firm per period. Public offers is the share of offers which were public. 
Private incumbent wage is the maximum wage offered by a firm to its incumbent worker in a given period. Public wage is the maximum wage offered by the firm in a public 
offer in a given period. Private non-incumbent wage is the maximum wage offered by a firm in a private offer to another worker in a given period.  Realized trades is the total 
number of trades realized in a treatment. Trades in 1 period, 2-5 period, and 6-15 period relations show the share of trades which take place in relations with this final 
duration. Effort, Wage, Payoff firm, and Payoff worker are the means for realized trades. 
   
 
 
Table 4: Firms' contract offers 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependant variable Contract renewal Rent offered 
Treatment ICF-D ICF-S ICF-D & ICF-S ICF-D ICF-S ICF-D & ICF-S 
Prior effort 0.457 0.363 0.088 4.469 5.256 5.527 
 [0.059]*** [0.047]*** [0.009]*** [0.365]*** [0.610]*** [0.526]*** 
Negative surprise -0.299 -0.443 -0.1 -1.604 1.281 1.501 
 [0.323] [0.228]* [0.049]** [2.025] [3.133] [2.816] 
Period 11-15 0.36 0.4 0.085 6.218 3.99 3.68 
 [0.273] [0.179]** [0.033]** [1.255]*** [1.602]** [1.446]** 
Excess demand   0.132   -5.78 
   [0.100]   [6.090] 
Excess demand * Prior effort   -0.011   -0.924 
   [0.011]   [0.685] 
Excess demand * Negative surprise   0.051   -2.952 
   [0.067]   [3.654] 
Excess demand * Period 11-15   -0.044   2.224 
   [0.047]   [2.020] 
Constant -2.357 -2.186 -0.031 -23.363 -16.751 -18.451 
 [0.494]*** [0.384]*** [0.074] [3.290]*** [5.419]*** [4.632]*** 
Observations 485 488 973 306 288 594 
Number of firms 50 35 85 47 35 82 
Method Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Firm random effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
Notes. The dependant variable in columns (1-3) is the dummy variable Contract renewal which equals 1 if the firm offered a private contract to its incumbent worker and 
equals 0 otherwise. The dependant variable in columns (4-6) is the Rent offered in repeat contracts, i.e. the wage offered by the firms minus the mean wage in public contract 
offers in that period. Prior effort is the effort provided by the worker in the prior period. Negative surprise is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the worker provided less 
effort than expected by the firm in the prior period, and 0 otherwise. Period 11-15 is a dummy variable which is 1 for periods 11 -15 and 0 for periods 2-10.  Excess demand is 
a dummy variable which equals 1 for the observations from the ICF-D treatment and 0 for observations from the ICF-S treatment. Standard errors are reported in brackets. 
*,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%  level respectively. The estimates reported in column (3) are based on OLS due to the difficulties with interpreting 
interaction terms in the probit model (see Ai and Norton, 2003). 
   
 
 
Table 5. Worker effort 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatments ICF-D ICF-S ICF-D & ICF-S ICR-D ICR-S ICR-D & ICR-S 
Wage 0.103 0.143 0.143 0.097 0.11 0.108 
 [0.008]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** 
Private 1.21 0.514 0.51 0.324 0.38 0.392 
 [0.214]*** [0.183]*** [0.218]** [0.150]** [0.148]** [0.166]** 
Period 11-15 -0.782 -0.397 -0.397 -0.098 0.052 0.043 
 [0.178]*** [0.138]*** [0.164]** [0.142] [0.140] [0.155] 
Excess demand   -0.343   0.222 
   [0.505]   [0.427] 
Excess demand* Wage   -0.039   -0.011 
   [0.010]***   [0.008] 
Excess demand * Private   0.749   -0.066 
   [0.289]***   [0.216] 
Excess demand * Period 11-15   -0.393   -0.141 
   [0.228]*   [0.204] 
Constant 0.566 0.816 0.819 0.811 0.535 0.578 
 [0.485] [0.230]*** [0.273]*** [0.396]** [0.197]*** [0.259]** 
Observations 520 523 1043 523 417 940 
Number of workers 35 50 85 35 40 75 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Worker random effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
Notes. The dependant variable is Effort. Wage is the wage offered by the firm in the contract accepted by the worker. Private is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
accepted contract was a private offer and 0 if it was a public offer. Period 11-15 is a dummy variable which is 1 for periods 11 -15 and 0 for periods 2-10.  Excess demand is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 for the observations from the ICF-D (ICR-D) treatment and 0 for observations from the ICF-S (ICR-S) treatment. Standard errors are reported 
in brackets. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%  level respectively.   
   
 
 
Table A1. Classification of workers by fairness attitudes 
 
Fairness class (1= low, 6=high) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Mean share of surplus to firm <10% 10%-20% 20%-30% 30% - 40% 40% -50% >50% 
ICR-D  0.05 0.23 0.18 0.23 0.23 0.10 
ICR-S 0.17 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.11 0.06 
 
Notes. The table displays the share of workers by fairness class for the ICR-D and ICR-
S treatments. We classify individual workers according to the mean share of surplus 
which their effort implies for their firm across all their trades. The firm's share of 
surplus from a trade is defined as: (10e-w) / (10e-c(e)). For trades in which the firm 
earns negative profits we set its share to 0. For trades in which the workers earn 
negative profits we set the firm's share of surplus to 1. 
 
 
